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 The macroeconomic development in
Denmark has been favourable since 1993,
where unemployment peaked at 12 per cent
of the labour force and the public deficit
reached 3 per cent of GDP. By 2000,
unemployment had fallen to 5 per cent, and
the surplus on public finances amounted to
almost 3 per cent of GDP. The recovery began
in 1994 and was kick started by a minor fiscal
stimulus of 1 per cent of GDP, a temporary
reduction of income taxes combined with
measures to stimulate activity in the
construction sector.
Despite strong growth since 1994,
inflation has remained modest, at levels
consistent with a policy of keeping a fixed
exchange rate vis-à-vis the German mark and,
since 1999, the euro. Furthermore, the long
period of economic expansion has not
resulted in massive current account deficits,
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Based on generational accounts and a simple welfare calculus, this paper studies two
alternative scenarios of sustainable fiscal policy in Denmark. A strategy of tax smoothing is
found to provide a fairly even intergenerational distribution of the financial burden
associated with population ageing. While tax smoothing causes a relatively sharp increase
in public debt along the transition path, a strategy of debt smoothing is shown to pass a
larger part of the financial burden onto current generations but without changing the
intergenerational distribution profile in any dramatic way. A comparison based on a social
welfare function indicates a marginal superiority of tax smoothing.  JEL: E62, H66unlike past experience in Denmark. This
suggests that the structural reforms
undertaken during the 1990s have been quite
successful, although it is difficult to disen-
tangle the effects of substantial structural
reforms from the effects of cyclical factors. 
Denmark has decided not to participate
in the final stage of EMU. However,
macroeconomic policy has been conducted
according to a commitment to the principles
of nominal convergence and fiscal discipline.
The position of the Danish government is to
adhere strictly to public debt reduction. The
gross public debt-GDP ratio has already been
brought down from almost 80 per cent in
1993 to 48 per cent in 2000. And the official
target set by the current government involves
a further reduction in the debt-GDP ratio to
24 per cent by year 2010. 
While the current state of the Danish
economy thus appears strong, the purpose of
this paper is to examine whether similarly
optimistic conclusions can be drawn about
the medium-to-long term. Our major
concern is the future stance of public finances.
Among the questions we try to answer are the
following: Is current fiscal policy sustainable?
If not, what is the magnitude of the fiscal
imbalance? To what extent are we passing
fiscal burdens onto future generations? How
would alternative fiscal strategies impact on
the macroeconomy and the distribution of
welfare across different current and future
generations?
There are several reasons why we think
these questions deserve addressing: First, the
process of changing demographics is likely to
lead to a substantial increase in the number
of elderly, a phenomenon which will un-
doubtedly put upward pressure on public
expenditures. Second, the long-term trend for
people of working-age to wish more leisure
could continue. Third, a further tendency
towards a shorter working life could be
observed. This would reinforce the budgetary
pressure caused by population ageing. 
Other challenges, mainly some associated
with ''globalisation'' and/or ''Europeaniza-
tion'', could be added. For example, one could
envisage that it will be increasingly difficult
to raise the revenues needed to sustain the
financial viability of the welfare state.
Increased mobility within Europe may induce
some members of the labour force to flee to
lower-tax jurisdictions, thereby eroding the
tax base. A similar problem concerning
corporate taxation may arise. Public finances
could also come up against the fiscal prudence
criteria of the Growth and Stability Pact
(GSP), according to which EMU members
should produce a medium-term budgetary
position of close to balance or in surplus.
We conclude that the sustainable tax rate
is around 1 percentage point above the
relevant benchmark tax rate, corresponding
to a need for a permanent increase in income
taxation of approximately 0.75 per cent of
GDP. Therefore, in strict sense current fiscal
policy is not sustainable, but there is no
indication of a dramatic fiscal imbalance. The
results thus underline the importance of
bringing public debt down now when there is
demographic breathing-space, rather than
postponing the adjustment until the ageing
of the population starts. 
If preferences for generational fairness are
heavily weighted, a policy of tax smoothing
would be wise. However, during the transition
period a policy of that kind would produce
public debt-GDP ratios that might be in
conflict with the GSP. Hence we consider an
alternative scenario where the public debt-
GDP ratio is held constant throughout (''debt
smoothing''). Using the tool of generational
accounts, we find that all currently living
generations would suffer if fiscal policy is
conducted in terms of debt rather than tax
smoothing.
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produce particularly alarming outcomes,
there is a trade-off between temporary (exces-
sive?) debt accumulation and (unfair?)
generational redistribution. We address this
dilemma by formulating a social welfare
function and find that there is a one-off social
welfare gain of 0.6 per cent of GDP in factor
prices by implementing pure tax smoothing
instead of pure debt smoothing. The relatively
modest gain from tax smoothing suggests that
the costs of complying with the GSP
requirements are small. And, since this result
does not imply that tax smoothing is optimal,
it might well be more sensible to adopt a
mixed regime. For example, this could take
the form of an increase in the financial burden
on current generations implemented through
lower transfer payments. This would also
reduce the size of government and thereby
pave the way for a lower tax burden in the
future. 
From here we proceed as follows. The next
section offers a brief overview of some recent
macroeconomic trends. Section 3 presents a
unified framework for generational account-
ing and intertemporal simulation modelling.
Sections 4 and 5 then show some macro-
economic, budgetary and generational effects
of alternative fiscal policies. Section 6 con-
cludes.
Recent macroeconomic trends
Two major tax reforms have been imple-
mented during the 1990s, both aiming at
bringing down marginal tax rates on personal
income by broadening the tax base and
switching towards green taxes. The tax
reforms have been motivated by a need for
improving not only the incentives to work
but also to strengthen households' savings in
order to improve the current account,
traditionally the Achilles’ heel of the Danish
economy. The tax value of the deductable
interest expenses will be brought down from
52 per cent in the early 1990s to 33 per cent
in 2002. Hence the incentive to save has
increased significantly. Although the highest
marginal tax rate on income has been brought
down from 69 to 63 per cent, and the average
marginal tax rate of full-time employed
people is expected to fall from 59.3 per cent
in 1993 to 54.4 per cent in 2002, the
economic incentives to become employed for
unskilled workers are still low. The tax system
has also been modified in view of the increased
international mobility of capital. The
nominal corporate tax rate has been brought
down from 50 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent
in 2001, thereby making the tax system more
robust with respect to profit shifting of
international firms. As the reductions have
been financed by tightening depreciation
allowances, the marginal effective tax rate has,
however, remained fairly constant. 
The 1990s have also witnessed several
abour market reforms. Some aggregate
evidence reported by the OECD points
towards a substantial fall in structural
unemployment, from 8.4 in 1993 to 6.3 in
1999. A major characteristic has been an
increased use of active labour market policies,
including compulsory activation of the
unemployed after one year of unemployment.
Microeconometric evidence shows that the
probability of finding a job goes up as 
the point for compulsory activation is
approaching, suggesting (but not implying)
that the ALMPs have lowered unemployment
(Ministry of Labour, 2000). Moreover,
availability requirements have been tightened,
eligibility criteria have been strenghtened and
the generosity of certain benefits have been
reduced. For example, the maximum duration
of unemployment benefits has been reduced
from 9 to 4 years, and the so-called ''youth
package'' reduced unemployment benefits for
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months of unemployment. The effect of the
latter reform has been a significant reduction
in the youth unemployment.
With the aim of increasing labour supply,
two reforms concerning the retirement
decision have been implemented. First, the
so-called transitory retirement scheme for
long term unemployed persons in the age-
groups from 50 to 60 years has been
abandoned. Second, the early retirement
benefit scheme allowing people to retire at
the age of 60 was reformed in 1998. This
reform makes retirement before the age of 62
less attractive and offers a premium to people
who abstains from using the scheme. Further-
more, entitlement to these benefits requires
that a contribution rate has been paid at least
25 years prior to retirement. Despite these
initiatives, the number of working-age people
who are outside the labour force and receives
public transfers remains high. Undoubtedly,
further reforms are needed if a significant
reduction in the labour force is to be avoided.
Another major structural change in the
Danish economy is that there has been a
dramatic increase in private, fully-funded
pension schemes, see below. The contribution
rate of blue-collar workers is now being
increased to typically 9 per cent of the wage
income, for white-collar workers and public
employees rates are 12-15 per cent. The
contributions amount to almost 5 per cent of
GDP. At present, the total wealth of private
pension funds is 75 per cent of GDP but is
expected to reach a level of almost 200 per
cent of GDP in 2050.
Since the public sector is relative large in
Denmark, it is not surprising that the
government budget is very sensitive to the
business cycle. However, a significant part of
the recent improvement might be of a more
structural nature. Indeed, based on the
standard technique of applying relevant
revenue and expenditure elasticities to the
output gap, the structural balance has been
estimated to 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2000, an
improvement of almost 6 per cent of GDP
since 1993 (European Commission, 2001).
Hence, a part of the improvement of public
finances reflects structural factors, among
which the fall in the structural rate of
unemployment is dominant.
By international comparison, it is remark-
able that Danish politicians, even with
surpluses of almost 3 per cent of GDP, have
resisted the temptation to implement
unfinanced tax cuts similarly to what has
recently been seen in Germany, the
Netherlands, France and Sweden. The
strategy of debt-reduction has led to a fall in
the gross debt-GDP ratio from 80 per cent in
1993 to 53 per cent by the end of 1999 and
is expected to be only 44 per cent by the end
of 2001. Taking into consideration the assets
of the funded supplementary public pension
fund ATP, net debt is at present only 16 per
cent of GDP.
Public expenditures on transfers have
decreased (mainly due to the decreased
number of unemployed) in recent years.
However, public consumption has continued
to increase beyond the targets set out by the
government. The official target is to reduce
the real growth of public consumption to 1
per cent a year. However, based on budgets
for 2001, real public consumption will on
average grow by 2 per cent from 1997 to 2001.
The increase cannot be explained by shifts in
demography affecting age-related spending;
rather, it reflects an increase in the standards
of public service. Indeed, the repeated
overruns have been made possible by the fact
that two thirds of public consumption take
place at the level of local governments, thus
beyond the direct control of the central
government. When measured as a percentage
of GDP, public consumption has remained
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However, by international comparison the
level of public consumption is high. In the
euro-area, for instance, public consumption
is only 20 per cent of GDP, compared to 25
per cent in Denmark.
Generational accounting and GE
modelling – an integrated approach
This section seeks to evaluate the sustain-
ability of fiscal policy in Denmark within a
unified framework of generational accounting
and dynamic general equilibrium modelling.
For that purpose we employ the DREAM
model, which is an OLG-CGE model of the
Danish economy formulated in the spirit of
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
1 Here we
focus on how the age-specific profiles of
public expenditures and revenues, the under-
lying demographic projection and the
pension system in Denmark have been
incorporated into the model.
Age dependent public expenditures and
revenues
Public consumption
Following the methodology of generational
accounting, public consumption is split into
two parts: individual and collective. The
former is defined as those parts of public
consumption that are attributed directly to
individuals. This includes strictly rival goods,
such as medicare and residential homes for
elderly people, as well as goods that are partly
non-rival goods such as education and
libraries. For each of these types of goods the
total expenditures have been distributed
across individuals of a given generation
according to each generation's use of the
particular good, based on behaviour in 1998.
It is assumed that this distribution remains
unchanged throughout the projection period.
In 1998 two thirds of the total public
consumption were defined as individual
public consumption. Its real value (per
individual of a given age) is assumed to grow
in line with real GDP. In a steady state with a
stationary population this assumption implies
that the individual public consumption
constitutes a fixed proportion of GDP.
However, along the transition path to the
steady state, the individual public consump-
tion may grow faster than real GDP due to
changes in the demographic composition of
the population.
2
The real value of the collective part of
public consumption, consisting of pure non-
rival goods such as defence and police, is
assumed to grow in line with real GDP. In the
generational accounts presented below these
expenditures are distributed across genera-
tions according to the number of adults in
each generation. The demographic changes
along the transition path of the economy
affects the level of collective public
consumption per adult.
Public transfers
Gross public transfers to individuals
constituted 21 per cent of GDP at factor
prices in 1998. Almost all transfers to
individuals are subject to income taxation and
net transfers are therefore significantly lower.
Here transfers are divided into one part that
is determined endogenously and another part
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1. DREAM is an acronym for Danish Rational Economic Agents Model. Details of the model are available in
Knudsen, Pedersen, Petersen, Stephensen and Trier (1998, 1999) and Pedersen, Stephensen and Trier (1999).
General information on DREAM is available at http://www.dreammodel.dk.
2. This is indeed the case in the present projection, where the individual (age-dependent) public consumption in-
creases from 21 per cent of GDP at factor prices in 1998 to a peak of 24 percent of GDP in 2038.based on exogenous projections. We assume
that the labour force (measured in number of
persons) is determined by the demographic
projection. The fraction of the population of
a given age, gender and origin (native or
immigrants) that is in the labour force in 1998
is assumed to remain constant throughout.
Changes in the composition of the population
(with respect to age, gender and origin) would
thus lead to changes in the labour force.
3Since
employment and unemployment are deter-
mined endogenously, publicly financed
unemployment benefits are also determined
endogenously. Unemployment in the model
is for simplicity distributed across age, gender
and origin groups in the labour force such
that the unemployment rate for each group is
identical to the overall rate of unemployment.
The public transfers to persons outside the
labour force are determined by the following
procedure: The distribution of persons
receiving public transfers in 1998 is taken
from a register of all persons in Denmark
where individuals are classified according to
the type of income they receive. From this
register the fraction of a given age, gender and
origin group that receives a specific transfer
payment is obtained for a given year. In the
projection it is assumed that these fractions
remain constant through time. Given the
demographic projection this generates the
development in the number of persons
receiving the public transfers. The public
transfers are indexed to the wage rate and, as
wage determination is endogenous, indexa-
tion of transfers is also endogenous.
4
The remaining part of public expendi-
tures, most notably public investments and
interest payments on public debt, are
determined endogenously and have not been
allocated to generations in the reported
generational accounts. 
Public revenues
Public revenues are generally endogenous in
DREAM. The tax revenue from personal
income taxation is collected from the tax
payments of the households in the model. In
the generational accounting system these
taxes are distributed across generations simply
by using the endogenous tax revenue from
the generation in question. Various types of
personal income are taxed differently in the
Danish tax system. Since the model reflects
this fact, a given level of personal income may
lead to different levels of taxation depending
on the composition of income. Similarly,
revenue from indirect taxation is collected
from the indirect tax payments associated
with the private consumption of the
individual generations of households. These
revenues are also used directly in the
generational accounting system. Revenues
from direct and indirect taxation of firms,
most notably corporate taxes, are distributed
to generations according to the number of
adult-equivalents in each generation. The
same procedure is used for the revenue from
taxation of capital income in the fully funded
pension system. 
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3. Origin is included since immigrants have a significantly different labour market behaviour than the rest of the
population. This fact, combined with the fact that the present number of immigrants is very low and therefore
increasing over time for any reasonable projection of annual immigration, imply that the development in both
the labour force and public transfers to individuals are affected by the development in relative size of the num-
ber of immigrants.
4. In addition to these main public transfers there exists a group of transfers, which goes to both persons in the
labour force and persons outside the labour force. These transfers are distributed to the different generations us-
ing a procedure similar to the one applied to individual public consumption.A comparison to previous studies
The procedure outlined above differs
somewhat from the standard generational
accounting methodology (Auerbach,
Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1991) that was used
in two previous studies of the generational
stance of fiscal policy in Denmark, see Jensen
and Raffelhüschen (1997, 1999). First, in the
present study we distribute both individual
and collective public consumption across
generations, whereas in the previous studies
only individual public consumption was
distributed. Second, while in this study both
direct and indirect taxes paid by firms and
insurance companies are distributed across
those generations that are active in the period
where the taxes are paid, this was the case only
for the personal direct and indirect taxes in
the previous generational accounts for
Denmark. Finally, in this study childhood is
excluded in the sense that public consump-
tion allocated to children below the age of 17
years is distributed to their mothers' gene-
rations. In the previous studies, however, also
children were assumed to have an economic
life. This simplification is made in order to
obtain consistency with the construction of
households in the DREAM model.
Demographic projections
The underlying demographic projection is
based on Statistics Denmark (1999) and
Petersen (1999). Two age groups are of special
interest, namely those of working age and the
elderly. The former (aged 15-64) is projected
to increase slightly until 2010, whereupon it
starts shrinking and remains below the current
level throughout this century. Labour market
participation rates are assumed constant, but
changes in the demographic composition of
the labour force magnify the reduction that
follows from the reduction in the total
number of persons in that age group. The
number of working hours per individual is
reduced by 2 percent until 2002 to account
for the reduction in working hours in the
recent bargaining agreement in the private
sector. After 2002 the number of working
hours per individual is assumed to remain
constant. These assumptions taken together
imply a fall in the number of working hours
of around 7.5 per cent from 1998 to 2038.
Thereafter, the labour force is growing
slightly; yet it remains 5 per cent below the
1998 level throughout the century.
The number of persons aged 60 and above
is increasing throughout the first half of the
century, implying that by 2040 this age group
has grown by almost 50 per cent compared to
1998.
5 Also the number of persons aged 80
and above is expected to increase by 45 per
cent in the same period (''double-ageing'').
From 2040 the number of persons aged 60
and above stabilises at the new level. However,
the number of persons aged 80 and above
continues to increase, meaning an expected
rise by around 60 per cent over the next five
decades.
Against the prospect of a falling work-
force and a rising group of retirees, a growing
demographic burden is inevitable. The so-
called corrected dependency ratio, defined as
the number of persons who are not in the
labour force divided by the labour force
measured in the number of working hours, is
projected to increase by 30 per cent from 1998
to 2038. In the remaining period the
corrected dependency ratio stabilises at a level
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5. The official retirement age in Denmark is currently 67, but falling to 65 by year 2005. However, the existence
of the early retirement benefit scheme, reserved for persons aged 60-66, implies that the effective retirement age
is relatively close to 60 years.of 25 per cent higher than in 1998. This
indicates that the expected increase in
expenditures related to the demographic
development is not just a temporary
phenomenon related to the large postwar
generations, but a permanent shift. 
Finally, from a modelling perspective, a
novelty here is that the demographic
projection is incorporated directly into the
household structure of the model.
6
The pension system in Denmark
The Danish pension system consists of four
pillars: First, a pure pay-as-you-go pension
system that distributes pensions to all persons
aged 67 and above.
7 Second, a fully funded
general labour market pension scheme (ATP)
covering all persons in the labour force.
8
Third, fully funded contribution-defined
labour market pension schemes that are
negotiated between trade unions and
employers' federations as part of the wage
bargain. Fourth, fully funded individual
pensions. In addition to these schemes a
number of public employees are entitled to
civil servants pension.
9
While the PAYG scheme is likely to remain
a crucial part of the Danish welfare system,
future pensions in Denmark will increasingly
be based on funded systems. This structural
shift has two major effects. First, total pension
payments per pensioner is expected to
increase at a much higher speed than the
growth of income for an employed person.
Second, and most importantly, this shift will
tend to reduce the intergenerational redistri-
bution effects associated with changing
demographics. Indeed, it is well-known that
the economic impact of changing demo-
graphics depends crucially on the pension
system being in operation (Sandmo, 1992).
In a small, open economy with free capital
mobility, a pure fully funded pension system
implies that each generation pays for its own
pension and no intergenerational effects are
present in the absence of tax distortions.
Contrariwise, a pure pay-as-you-go system
implies that each working generation pays the
pension benefits to the overlapping genera-
tions of retirees. Therefore, this system
involves intergenerational transfers and the
size of these transfers are affected by the
relative sizes of the generations.
The funded pension systems in Denmark
are relatively young, as reflected in low levels
of present average pension payments relative
to the level of contributions. For the blue collar
part of the labour market the funded labour
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6. See Knudsen, Pedersen, Petersen, Stephensen and Trier (1998) for a detailed description of the construction and
the behaviour of the households in DREAM.
7. While basically a flat-rate system, there are some exceptions. First, there are reductions in the pension for per-
sons who have been living in Denmark for less than 30 years after becoming 18 years old. Second, in addition
to the flat rate pension benefit there is an income-dependent part which constitutes around 40 per cent of the
average social pension in 1998. Given the rules this indicates that only a minor fraction of the pensioners in
1998 had pension payments from the funded pension system.
8. The Danish system of national accounts defines ATP as a public pension system. Therefore, contributions to
the system are modelled as income to the public sector, and pension payments from ATP are treated as public
expenditures.
9. In DREAM pension funds of type three and type four are modelled as endogenous non-matured actuarially fair
non-profit insurance companies with a behaviour determined by a set of rules approved by the Danish author-
ities, see Pedersen, Stephensen and Trier (1999) for details of the modelling of pension funds. The contribution
rates are assumed to be fixed at the current levels, except for a slight increase due to the agreed increases in the
contribution rate for blue-collar workers until 2004 and a shift in the composition of the public employment
from persons with civil servants pension to employees with a funded pension arrangement.market pension system was initiated in the
beginning of the 1990s. The level of
contributions as a percentage of the annual
wage is expected to reach the long run level of
9 per cent in 2004. Therefore, this pension
system needs a full life time of a generation to
reach a situation where all pensioners receive
pensions based on the long run level of
contributions in their entire working-life. This
implies that the funded system is not expected
to be fully matured before around year 2070.
10
The non-mature status of the funded
pension systems in Denmark also has major
effects on the tax base of the personal income
tax in the transition period. This is due to the
fact that contributions to pension systems are
deductible in the personal income tax whereas
pension payments from the pension funds are
taxable at the personal income tax rate. This
feature implies that the personal income tax
base is low in an economy with a non-matured
pension fund (due to the high contributions
and the low pension payment from the fund),
and the tax-base is increasing through time as
the pension fund matures.
11 This automatic
increase in the tax base as the pension funds
mature is a feature that is unique in the EU
for Denmark and the Netherlands (European
Commission, 2000). The increase in the tax
base of course implies that for a given initial
position of the public debt the financing of
the expected increase in the age-burden may
require a smaller accommodation in these
countries than in others faced with the same
type of problems.
In sum, the shift towards larger
dependence on funded pension systems will
reduce the impact on future shifts in the
demographic composition on the inter-
generational distribution of income.
However, the conversion came too late to
significantly redress the budgetary effects of
the expected increase in the old-age burden
from 2020 to 2040.
Fiscal policy and the foreign sector
The existence of an equilibrium with perfect
foresight requires that all agents in the
economy fulfil their intertemporal budget
constraints. Therefore, we need a specific
policy reaction function to ensure that the
government's intertemporal budget con-
straint is met. Public expenditures are given
by the demographic development, the age-
dependent public consumption and public
transfers and the indexation rules. We assume
that the tax structure remains stable and that
all indirect tax rates (measured in VAT-
equivalents) remain fixed.
12 To fulfil the
intertemporal budget constraint we adjust the
base tax rate of the personal income tax
system. More precisely, we define the
sustainable tax rate as the lowest possible
constant (or permanent) level of the base tax
rate of the personal income tax system which
is sufficient to fulfil the intertemporal budget
constraint. The sustainable constant tax rate
is set such that the growth and inflation
corrected value of the primary surplus on the
public budget is equal to the growth and
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10. Labour market pension schemes for white-collar workers and public employees are older systems. These systems
were started in the 1950s and 1960s, and they are therefore expected to mature earlier.
11. The positive effect on the public budget as the pension system matures does not apply to the ATP pension sys-
tem in DREAM. Since this system is treated as a part of the public sector, contributions are similar to taxes
whereas pension payments from the fund are similar to public pensions. Therefore the non-mature ATP-pension
system has a positive effect of the public budget which is reduced as the system matures.
12. This implies that the potential pressure from international tax competition on, e.g., corporate taxation and
capital income taxation is ignored. The same is true for the cross-border trade effects on indirect tax rates.inflation corrected interest payments on the
public debt in the steady state.
The (announced and actual) economic
policy, including the announced reduction in
the tax rates, is assumed to follow what has
already been legislated. This means that tax
rates are exogenous until 2003, from which
year the policy of the sustainable tax rate is
introduced. Two things should be noticed
here. First, the difference between the
sustainable tax rate and the basic tax rate in
2003 serves as an intelligible indicator of
sustainability: if the former is higher than the
latter, a fiscal tightening of that magnitude is
required, and vice versa. Second, the
introduction of the sustainable tax rate
implies that the government follows a policy
of perfect tax smoothing, which identifies our
baseline fiscal policy framework. 
The foreign sector is modelled as ''neutral''
as possible. This implies that the rate of
foreign inflation is constant at a 1.5 per cent
level, the rate of growth of foreign demand
for domestic export grows – for given relative
prices – at the rate of Harrod-neutral
technological progress in the domestic
country, which also is assumed to be 1.5 per
cent. The nominal foreign interest rate is kept
constant through time at a level of 5.56 per
cent, amounting to a real interest rate of 4.0
per cent. These assumptions are made to
dampen the effects on the domestic economy
in order to isolate the effects of the domestic
demographic ageing. These assumptions
imply that any effects of demographic ageing
on the world economy are ignored. 
Tax Smoothing
Macroeconomic performance
The assumption of perfect financial capital
markets and the constant international rate
of interest combined with the fixed tax rates
in the corporate sector imply that the user
cost of capital, and therefore the (long run)
K/L ratios in the production sectors and the
wage rates are relatively fixed. Hence total
production is closely linked to the
development of the labour force. However,
this fundamental supply side property of the
model is modified by the presence of, first,
endogenous terms of trade which generate
(minor) changes in the user cost of capital
and, second, installation costs of capital which
imply that the K/L ratios only gradually
approach their long run levels. These
phenomena are reflected in the development
of real GDP at factor prices, see table 1.
13 The
real growth-corrected value of GDP is
gradually reduced from 2008 to 2038 where
the level is 3 per cent below the level in 1998
and approximately 6 per cent below the level
in 2008. This reflects the drop in the labour
force by 7.5 per cent from 1998 to 2038. The
effect of the falling the labour force is
modified by the fact that the new long run
K/L ratio is higher than in the initial
equilibrium. Furthermore, there is a minor
reduction of approximately 1 percentage
point in the unemployment rate.
The sustainable tax rate is 1.1 percentage
point higher than the tax rate under current
legislation. Since the tax base of the general
income tax is about 75 per cent of GDP, this
amounts to raising taxes by 0.75 per cent of
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13. In all tables the levels of real values are measured in so-called growth-corrected units, meaning that actual real
numbers are deflated by an annual growth rate of 1.5 per cent (equal to the Harrod-neutral technological change).
Similarly, nominal values are measured in so-called inflation- and growth-corrected units which means that the
actual nominal numbers are deflated by an annual growth rate of approximately 3 per cent (equal to 1.5 per
cent inflation and 1.5 per cent real growth).GDP. Therefore, current fiscal policy in not
sustainable, but the necessary adjustment is
relatively small.
The substantial improvement of the net
foreign asset position is another remarkable
feature of the dynamic adjustment. This
reflects the fact that the K/L ratios are fairly
fixed. Clearly, as the labour force is falling
quite dramatically, real investments must also
fall, and savings have to be directed towards
accumulation of foreign assets. This effect is
enhanced by an assumed net saving effect
from the labour market pension schemes, see
also Ministry of Economic Affairs (2000).
14
This effect also explains why private
consumption in the new steady state has
increased by 4 per cent compared to 1998.
The public budget
Changing demographics are reflected in the
public expenditures. First of all, the increased
old-age dependency ratio that peaks in 2038
leads to an increase in the expenditures to
social pensions relative to GDP at factor prices
by 2.4 percentage points. The total effects on
expenditures relative to GDP from public
transfers amount to an increase by 3.9
percentage points. Hence other transfers have
increased, mostly increased pension payments
from the (public) labour market pension fund
(ATP).
From 1998 to 2038 the value of the age-
dependent public consumption relative to
GDP at factor prices increases by 2.7
percentage points, and total public
expenditures relative to GDP increase by 8.6
percentage points. The increase in the non-
age-dependent public expenditures is due to
an increase in the public investments to keep
a constant capital output ratio in the public
production and an increase in the interest
payments on public debt. 
Total revenues relative to GDP at factor
prices increase by 4.3 percentage point from
1998 to 2038. The automatic increase in the
tax base of the personal income taxation from
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Table 1.
Macroeconomic behaviour under tax smoothing
14. This effect is included in the model to account for the possibility that mainly young households may be rationed
in the capital markets. As DREAM assumes perfect capital markets, this effect appears technically in the sense
that the planning horizon of the household is shorter than the expected lifetime used by the actuarially fair
pensions funds.
1998 1998 2008 2018 2038 2058 ∞
Level (bill. DKK) Growth and inflation corrected index, 1998=100 except where noted
Private consumption 475,1 100 96,6 98,2 99,0 99,8 104,0
Real GDP at factor prices 986,0 100 103,2 101,3 97,0 98,9 102,2
Employment 100 99,4 97,7 93,6 95,7 99,2
private production sector 100 98,7 96,1 89,7 91,7 93,9
construction sector 100 97,4 100,1 95,0 98,5 101,9
public sector 100 101,2 100,5 101,3 103,4 109,7
Capital in private production sector 100 114,6 111,8 105,5 107,0 109,5
Capital in construction sector 100 98,9 101,6 98,1 101,0 104,2
Capital in public sector 100 94,8 93,7 94,7 96,8 102,4
Foreign assets * -280,0 -0,3 0,2 0,5 0,7 0,7 1,0
* Index is foreign assets to nominal GDP at factor pricespension payments from the funded pension
system accounts for 2.5 percentage points of
this increase in revenues. The taxation of
capital income in the pension funds accounts
for 1.6 percentage points.
15 The combined
effect of the reduced labour force and the
increased tax rate keeps the remaining tax
revenues fairly constant.
Two features are particularly noteworthy.
First, we find that the increase in taxation from
the pension funds finances almost half of the
increase in the expenditures due to the change
in the demographic composition of
individuals. Therefore, the financial burden is
significantly reduced by the tax base effect.
Second, the increase in the public revenue
constitutes only half of the increase in the
expenditures (both measured relative to
GDP). In other words, generations living until
2038 only finances half of the demographic
burden, and the rest is left for future
generations through a huge increase in public
debt. Indeed, the net public debt-GDP ratio
increases from 25 per cent in 1998 to 57 per
cent in 2038. It peaks at approximately 67 per
cent around 2060 and is hereafter gradually
reduced to a steady state level of 42 per cent.
Moreover, table 2 shows that the increase
in the tax revenue from the automatic increase
in the tax base continues until 2058 and
therefore contributes to generate public
surpluses that gradually reduce the public
debt to the steady state level. Again, this
indicates that the introduction of funded
pension schemes in the Danish economy
came too late to fully match the increase in
the public expenditure driven by the ageing
of the large postwar generations.
So, although the public sector fulfils its
intertemporal budget constraint, several years
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Table 2.
Public expentures and revenues under tax smoothing
15. This is a gross effect. Private savings are reduced to partially offset the increase in pensions savings, which tends
to reduce the revenue from the personal capital income tax.
1998 1998 2008 2018 2038 2058 ∞
Level (bill. DKK) Percentage of nominal GDP at factor costs
Expenditures 559,6 56,8 58,4 60,6 65,3 64,7 64,6
Social pensions * 102,6 10,4 10,8 11,7 12,8 11,8 11,9
Civil servants pension, ATP and LD 17,3 1,8 2,6 3,4 3,2 3,1 3,0
Agedependent public transfers 87,8 8,9 8,4 8,4 8,9 8,8 8,8
Agedependent public consumption 206,6 21,0 21,6 21,8 23,6 23,6 24,5
Total of age dependent 414,3 42,0 43,3 45,3 48,6 47,2 48,1
Other expenditures 145,3 14,7 15,1 15,3 16,8 17,5 16,5
Tax revenues 573,1 58,1 57,9 59,5 62,4 62,7 63,5
Social pensions * 26,6 2,7 2,7 2,9 3,2 2,9 2,9
Civil servants pension, ATP and LD 7,2 0,7 1,0 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,2
Labour market pensions 8,1 0,8 0,9 1,3 2,6 3,5 3,7
Private pensions 6,8 0,7 0,7 0,8 1,4 1,1 1,2
Pension funds 3,9 0,4 0,9 1,3 2,0 2,1 2,2
Other taxes 520,6 52,8 51,8 51,8 52,0 51,9 52,2
Net debt 253,3 25,7 19,4 24,6 56,7 66,1 41,7
* Early retirement benefits, early reitrements pensions, transitional benefits and public age pensionsduring the transition period will be
characterized by budget deficits and
associated debt accumulation. Is this a matter
of concern? It is hard to say, but as a
participant in the EMU (though not the final
stage), economic policy in Denmark is
somehow restricted by the Maastricht fiscal
criteria.
16If these criteria are repeatedly
violated over the next five decades, a strategy
of tax smoothing could not only upset
Denmark's partners in the EU but also run
into problems such as higher costs of
financing public debt (Alesina, De Broeck
and Tabellini, 1993). 
Generational accounts
We now turn to an examination of the
(inter)generational properties of a strategy of
tax smoothing. For that purpose we construct
individual generational accounts, here
reported as the discounted value of the sum
of public transfers and public consumption
net of the discounted value of the sum of
direct and indirect taxes paid during the
remaining lifetime of a representative member
of each (current and future) generation.
Figure 1 portrays the absolute value of the
generational account for current and future
generations, presented in growth and inflation
corrected units. To the right of the vertical line
the accounts of generations born after 1981
are shown.
17These generations experience a full
lifetime as economic active agents over 17 years
from the base year in 1998. 
The generational accounts do not
distribute interest payments on public debt
and public investments across generations. As
these public expenditures are of significant
size in each period, the result is that all
generations who have a full lifetime in the
economy will end up with a negative account.
Note that the differences in the accounts for
these generations are small. The negative value
of generations that are born in the period after
the major change in the demographic
composition of the population stabilises
around -100.000 DKK. The generation born
in 1981 is better off with a negative account
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Figure 1.
Generational accounts under tax smoothing.  Thousand DKK per adult
16. These well-known criteria are that the gross public debt-GDP ratio must not exceed 60 per cent and that the
annual public deficit-GDP ratio must not exceed 3 per cent.
17. The figure presents the account for five year groups, such that the observation in 1981 represents the average
of the generations born in 1981 to 1985. The observation in 1986 represents the average of generations born
in 1986 to 1990, and so on.of -65.000 DKK. The primary explanation of
this difference is that generations born in the
future will be living in a period, where the
public debt is permanently higher due to the
smoothing of the financial burden. Therefore,
a larger part of their tax payments goes to
public debt service. Moreover, persons who
are living in the initial period are faced with a
lower tax burden than those generations who
become active after the policy of the sustain-
able tax rate has been introduced.
Concentrating on the generations that
experience less than a full lifetime as active
economic agents (generations to the left of
the vertical line in figure 1), the picture
resembles standard pictures of generational
accounts. First, we observe that the generation
born in the period from 1976 to 1980 is worse
off than the generation born in the period
after. This is so because the accounts only
measure net payments from the public sector
for the part of the life that remains after 1998.
This implies that the generational account of
the generation born in 1976 start counting
from the age of 22 years. However, the period
from 17 to 21 years is a period where the
generations receive a positive net transfer from
the public sector. For the generation born in
1971 the account is slightly more favourable
than the account for those born in 1976, the
reason being that for the age-groups from 22
to 27 years the net transfer from the public
sector is negative. The same is true for the
remaining generations in the work force and
therefore the generational accounts are
increasing with the age of the generation in
1998.
Debt Smoothing
The macroeconomy and public finances
The aim of this section is to consider the
trade-off between intergenerational burden
sharing and the accumulation of public debt.
The policy rule discussed in the previous
section is therefore contrasted with a policy
rule that keeps the growth-corrected value of
the public debt constant (''debt smoothing'').
This policy goal is obtained by adjusting the
base tax rate of personal income. 
As noted already, the change in the
demographic dependency ratio after 2040,
combined with the fact that tax revenues from
pension payments from the funded pension
system is growing faster than the rest of the
economy until 2070, imply that the long run
financial burden of the demographic change
is lower than the temporary burden around
2040. Therefore, the tax rate of the personal
income tax system is higher under debt
smoothing compared to tax smoothing
throughout the first half of this century.
Thereafter the picture is reversed, which of
course is due to the lower interest payment
on public debt in the debt smoothing
scenario. The base tax rate peaks in 2038 at a
level 3.5 per cent higher than the announced
base tax rate in 2003, which is 2.4 percentage
points higher than in the tax smoothing case.
In 2058 the tax rate falls slightly below the
smooth tax rate, and in the long run the base
tax rate falls to a level similar to the announced
tax rate for 2003.
The macroeconomic consequences of this
change in the tax policy are very small on the
supply side of the economy, whereas the level
of aggregate consumption is reduced relative
to the tax smoothing scenario in the period
where the tax rate is higher than the smooth
tax rate. In 2058 aggregate consumption is
identical in the two scenaria and from this
point on the private consumption is higher in
the debt smoothing scenario. This pattern of
consumption simply reflects the pattern of
the tax rate in the two scenarios.
In the debt smoothing scenario the total
expenditures relative to GDP at factor prices
increase by 7.3 percentage points from 1998
56to the peak in 2038. This is 1.3 percentage
points lower than in the tax smoothing
scenario. The difference is entirely due to a
reduction in the interest payments on public
debt. Total public revenues increase by 5.4
percentage points. The reason why this is
sufficient to keep the public debt ratio
constant, even if the expenditures increase by
1.9 percentage point more, is that there is a
public surplus in 1998. This is turned into a
deficit to keep the debt growing at the same
rate of GDP.
Generational accounts and equivalent
variation
As reported in the previous subsection the
only major macroeconomic consequence of
the policy change is the reduction in the
public debt and the increase in the tax rate.
Therefore, the change in policy may be
considered as a pure change in the trade-off
between intergenerational burden sharing
and the development in the public debt.
Figure 2 reports the changes in the
generational accounts of the different
generations, when comparing the debt
smoothing polity to the tax smoothing policy.
Not surprisingly, the figure reveals that
generations currently alive and generations
born before 2006 will end up having a lower
(a more negative) net value of their
generational account. Of course, this reflects
that these generations are active in the
economy in the period, where the tax rate is
higher in the debt smoothing scenario. The
generation that has the largest loss in net value
is the generation that becomes active in 1998.
The loss for this generation is 6.000 DKK per
adult. Generations born after 2006 have a
higher net value of their generational account
in the debt smoothing scenario. These
generations become active in the economy in
2023, which is at the time, where the public
debt is rapidly increasing in the tax smoothing
scenario. In the debt smoothing scenario the
financing of the interest payments on public
debt is lower and hence the tax rate needed to
finance public expenditures is lower. This
generates the increase in the net value of the
generational accounts. For generations born
after 2050 the increase stabilises around
15.000 DKK per adult measured in growth
and inflation corrected units.
A different approach to measuring the
intergenerational distribution is to compute
the equivalent variation (EV) for each
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Figure 2.
Absolute difference in generational accounts (debt smoothing vs. tax smoothing) 
Thousand DKK per adultgeneration. This measures the amount of
money per adult that a generation is willing
to pay (measured in the prices of the tax
smoothing scenario) for a shift of policy to
the debt smoothing scenario. A negative
amount therefore means that the generation
is worse of in the debt smoothing scenario. 
EV may be reduced to a measure of the
relative change in utility times the initial stock
of financial and human capital of the
household in question.
18 The utility function
of the households in DREAM is traditional
in the sense that it is defined over the set of
private consumption goods and leisure. The
individual public consumption does therefore
not affect the EV measure. However, the
present policy change does not involve public
consumption, and therefore EV may be
considered a measure of ''total'' utility
including individual public consumption iff
the utility function is specified as additive
separable in the individual public con-
sumption.
As shown in figure 3, the similarity
between the EV measure and the generational
accounts reported in Figure 2 is striking. The
generations that are worse off according to
the EV measure is approximately the same as
the generations that experience a reduction in
their generational account. This means that
the generations that are currently active in the
labour market and the generations born in
the near future are worse off in the debt
smoothing scenario, whereas generations
born later in the future are better off in this
scenario. Only the generations born between
2006 and 2016 experience a different
evolution in the generational account and the
EV measure. These generations have higher
values in the generational accounts but are
worse off according to the EV measure.
The reason for the similarity between the
two measures is that in both cases the change
is driven by the shift in the tax burden of the
generation in question. An increase in the tax
burden directly reduces the generational
account, since the public consumption is
(almost) unaffected by the policy change. In
case of the EV measure, the increased tax
burden faced by the generation implies that
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Figure 3.
Equivalent variation.  Thousand DKK per adult
18. For a derivation of the EV measure in DREAM, see Madsen (2000).the after-tax value of income is reduced, and
therefore, the total consumption bundle that
the generation can afford over the life time is
reduced. This in turn reduces utility and
hence the EV becomes negative. The reason
why the generations born in 2006 to 2016
experience an increase in the value of the
generational account, and at the same time a
decrease in the EV is that the bequest from
the parent generations is lower because the
parent generations are poorer, since they face
an increased tax burden.
19
Finally, a social welfare function is
constructed to measure the total effect on
society from the policy change. The change
in the social welfare function is given as the
discounted sum of the population weighted
EV measures of each generation. The discount
rate is assumed to be the international rate of
interest.
20 Using this welfare function the tax
smoothing policy is found to be preferable to
society when compared to the debt smoothing
policy. The one-off gain from implementing
the tax smoothing policy amounts to 0.6 per
cent of GDP in factor prices.
This result is in line with the standard
argument in favour of tax smoothing, which
is that convex distortionary effects of taxes
make a smooth rate of taxation over time
preferable to a fluctuating one (Barro, 1979).
In DREAM the distortion of the base tax rate
of the personal income taxation is low, due to
the presence of an imperfectly competitive
labour market, and the fact that all transfers
including unemployment benefits are taxed
according to the personal income tax system.
The latter implies that a reduction in the base
tax rate, which leads to higher after tax wage
income also leads to a higher income for the
unemployed (since the tax rate on benefits is
also reduced). Therefore the improvement in
the incentive to become employed is very
modest. Hence, the absolute value of the gain
from the tax smoothing is also modest.
21
Concluding remarks
The current macroeconomic position of the
Danish economy is favourable, with a low rate
of unemployment and significant surpluses
on both the public budget and the current
account of the balance of payments.
Therefore, the initial position of the economy
tends to be relatively good, when it becomes
faced with the problem of the increased age
burden in the near future. The structural shift
towards higher dependency on fully funded
pension schemes also has a significant positive
effect on the Danish economy's ability to face
the demographic challenges.
Structural reforms of the tax system have
improved the incentives to save. This may be
very important in the case of Denmark, as a
low propensity to save historically has been a
major problem. However, faced with the
prospect of a reduced labour force, the
structural improvements from lower marginal
tax rates and from increased incentives for the
unskilled to become employed are needed.
Also, welfare reforms to increase the
incentives to enter the labour force could
further improve the position of the economy. 
The first main conclusion of our analysis
is that the fiscal policy in Denmark is almost
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19. A minor reduction in the overall activity due to general equilibrium effects also pull the result in this direction.
20. The social welfare function may be criticized on the grounds that the discounting of each generations EV mea-
sure is ad hoc. The standard argument for using the international interest rate is that this represents the alter-
native costs for the public sector when transfering wealth between generations.
21. Even without these effects from the taxation of the alternative to employment, the gain from tax smoothing in
CGE models tends to be small.sustainable, in the sense that a smooth tax
rate, which fulfils the intertemporal budget
constraint of the public sector is only 1.1
percentage point higher than the announced
base tax rate for 2003. The second main
conclusion is that a policy of tax smoothing
would not only smooth the financial burden
of demographic changes across generations,
but also cause a substantial increase in public
debt from 2020 to 2040. However, we show
that this latter effect can avoided by following
a policy of debt smoothing without
jeopardizing a equal distribution of the tax
burden. We finally demonstrate that the
increase in the social efficiency loss from a
policy of debt smoothing compared to a
policy of tax smoothing is almost negligible.
Overall, we conclude that a precautionary
fiscal policy that abstains from perfect tax
smoothing and increases the financial burden
of currently living generations relative to
future generations may be advisable.
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